President Pervez Musharraf's offer to open the Line of Control so that relief can be provided to the victims of the October 8 earthquake and India's positive response have the potential to transform the situation on the ground. If the agreement in principle is implemented, the `softening' of the LoC can become a reality over the short term at least. New Delhi and Islamabad have been exploring the possibility of opening routes, in addition to the Srinagar-Muzaffarabad road, for the movement of people and goods. They have also been trying to work out ways in which divided families on either side of the LoC can meet more frequently. Now, the quake-relief operations have presented an unexpected opportunity for operationalising these measures. The two Governments will need to flesh out the agreement and work out the modalities of implementing it. As it stands, the agreement means primarily that villagers on either side of the LoC will be able to cross over to assist their neighbours. In addition, there will be no objection if personnel trained in health care and public works join the relief operations; in any case, most of them will be drawn from the local population. Even if the interaction across the LoC will be only for the short term, it will represent significant movement towards the acceptance of the proposal for `soft borders' between India and Pakistan. This proposal is a compromise between Pakistan's refusal to make the LoC the permanent international boundary and India's rejection of any change in the territorial status quo.

Will interaction across the LoC become a permanent feature? Unfortunately, that does not appear feasible so long as terrorists continue to infiltrate into the Indian side. At some point in the not-distant future, New Delhi could come under pressure to tighten security at crossing points. Given the nature and scale of the natural calamity, it is a pity that the Indian and Pakistani armies are unlikely to be involved in the cross-LoC relief operations. They are clearly the actors best equipped to deal with challenges posed by the inhospitable terrain. More important, their cooperation in this humanitarian and constructive project can be a valuable confidence building measure. Pakistan believes that since the destruction on its side of the LoC has been far worse than on the Indian side, the aid flow will largely be one-way. General Musharraf's remarks about the need to "understand the sensitivities involved" suggest he would not like a situation to emerge where his army feels its pride has been wounded. The same consideration appears to have shaped his decision to accept "everything" New Delhi offered while refusing to allow personnel of the Indian army to enter territory controlled by Pakistan. There is however a silver lining: it was the pressure exerted by Pakistan's civil society that helped the General overcome the sensitivities to a heartening extent.