A journey of a thousand miles begins with a single step. Natwar Singh's proposal of a joint nuclear doctrine with Pakistan and China — first mooted by Rajiv Gandhi in 1988 — could turn out to be the historic first step of a long and arduous journey. Critics — and not just those currently occupying the Opposition benches — have already dismissed the idea as preposterous. True, the world has changed a lot since 1988. At that time, N-power status in the world was confined to the so-called P-5, which included the then two superpowers, the US and the USSR . Today, after Pokhran II, and its Pakistani counterblast in Chagai, that number has gone up to seven, with at least another two countries — Israel and South Africa — widely regarded as N-capable in all but name. Perhaps most importantly, Islamabad , which would not have realised its N-ambitions but for active Chinese assistance, has been exposed as a rogue power, which has been engaged in wilful proliferation to a number of third countries. To suggest a common nuclear doctrine in such a situation is bit like discussing an import-export regime with a professional smuggler. How can you trust someone whose livelihood depends on breaking the laws you seek to establish?

But it is precisely for this reason that such a seemingly impossible proposal be made: To initiate what, with increasing goodwill based on the prospect of mutual benefit, could turn out to be the beginning of a process of confidence building. A Pakistani team is expected shortly in New Delhi ; Natwar's dramatic announcement could be seen as a well-timed curtain raiser. An immediate stumbling block would be the no-first-use principle, which New Delhi has long committed itself to but which Islamabad has fought shy of, given India 's edge in the field of conventional armaments. Bringing on board Beijing , Islamabad 's closest strategic ally in the world, therefore, offers a way out. It addresses Islamabad 's misgivings about signing up to a nuclear accord with India , in the absence of a satisfactory resolution of the Kashmir issue. As for China , whose nuclear capabilities are far in excess of anything that either India or Pakistan possess, it may not have a lot to gain from the offer. But Beijing should, at the very least, recognise that Natwar's proposal is, implicitly, a recognition of China 's strategic pre-eminence in the region. And that this is a realistic basis for working out a long-term doctrine aimed at the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons in this part of the world.