Vladimir Putin won a resounding victory in the presidential election in March, consolidating his position in power as well as indicating a continuity in Russia's domestic and foreign policies. Russia has not been fashionable in the Indian discourse on international relations and strategic affairs. This phenomenon, however, should not blind us to the reality and importance of India's relations with Russia. This assertion is particularly relevant in the context of Putin having revived the centrality of India in his Asian policies since he came to power.

The geo-territorial identity of the Soviet Union was destroyed. But it did not diminish the range and content of India-Russia relations despite the initial hiccups which these relations had between 1990 and 1993. Indo-Russian relations maintain a basic continuity from the accumulated inheritance of relations between India and the former Soviet Union stretching back to nearly 40 years after this country gained independence. But the Yeltsin era was a period of exploratory interaction given the context of the Russian Federation engaged in structuring new global equations in the post-Soviet era.

Whatever the new orientations in India's foreign policy may be in developing relations with the US and other important powers, there is a clear acknowledgement in Delhi of the importance of Indo-Russian relations based on deep-rooted tradition and a mutuality of substantive interests.

India is a large and long-term market for Russia's defence exports and exports of oil and hydrocarbons. Russia has security and trading interests in the northern reaches of the Indian Ocean. A friendly India straddling the Indian Ocean rim is — and will be — a strategic asset to the Russian leadership. Russia, like India, has a plural civil society. It is, therefore, concerned about preserving its multi-dimensional national identity, an interest which India shares in terms of its national consolidation. While Russia has adjusted to its diminished international stature, it believes in the creation of a multi-polar world order.

Russia has proved to be a reliable partner in the transfer of sophisticated technologies of use to India — despite the expanding restrictive regimes sought to be imposed on transfer of such technologies. Russia is not only a large expanding market for Indian exports across the board — from raw materials to finished products — but is also a market for Indian investment and joint collaboration projects.

There is also a progressive concretisation of these interests in bilateral relations. Russia and India have managed the transition from economic and technological interaction conducted under governmental arrangements to the conduct of these relations by private sectors. A wide range of inter-State and inter-departmental agreements have been put in place over the last four years in a number of specialised spheres. These are implemented and monitored by a Russia India inter-governmental commission on trade, economics, scientific and technological cooperation.

Russian companies are now participating in the construction of nuclear and hydel-power plants, highways, modernisation and construction of steel plants, mining, oil and gas exploration in the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal, as well as in the North-eastern states. Russian companies are also involved in aluminium production, modernisation of railways, construction of water desalination plants and subways in India. The largest foreign investment of an Indian company has been made in Russia: ONGC-Videsh Limited has invested $ 1.7 billion for the development of oil and gas supplies at the Sakhalin-I Project in the Russian far east.

There has been a qualitative change in terms of reference of Russia-India military and technical cooperation. During the Soviet era, this cooperation was characterised by a cash-and-carry procedure catalysed through concessional credit arrangements. A smooth transition has taken place and now, military and technological cooperation is rooted in joint long-term programmes of research and development and joint production projects between the military and industrial organisations of the two countries. Transfer of technologies and licences for the production of sophisticated military equipment like the T-90 main battle tank and the SU-30 MK-I fighters are examples of this transition. Such cooperation extends to supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles like the Brahmos.

The purpose of detailing specifics of bilateral cooperation is to underline that Indo-Russian relations are substantive. This phenomenon is backed up by a broad convergence of interests in foreign policy orientations. Russia and India have a shared and uncompromising commitment against terrorism in all forms. The two countries are strong advocates of reviving the centrality of the UN in managing challenges to international peace and stability and the resolution of conflicts.

Though Russia has reservations about India's nuclear weaponisation, both the countries believe that the disarmament process should be continued to achieve non-discriminatory and equitable arrangement in the management of their nuclear weaponisation. These joint orientations towards significant international issues have found expression in the Declaration on Strategic Partnership signed in 2000 during Putin's visit to India. During his second visit to India in 2002, a further MoU was signed, creating a joint Indo-Russian Working Group on dealing with global challenges. This is apart from the institutionalised and regular consultations between officials of the security councils of the two countries.

Russia and India have a common approach to drafting an international anti-terrorism convention and also a comprehensive convention against acts of nuclear terrorism. And this commonality of approach has resulted in a close and effective cooperation between India and Russia at the UN and its relevant specialised agencies.

There are also possibilities of structuring equations between India, China, Russia and Iran, to strengthen regional security arra-ngements and to augment economic cooperation. Negotiations on specific projects are in the pipeline for such cooperation with positive potentialities.

One Cassandra-like question remains: since Russia is no longer a Great Power and it has its own interests and resulting equations with China and the United States, what is the need for India to continue giving importance to relations with Russia? Leaving aside the convergence of interests and attitudes described above, the fundamental reality is that though Russia may have lost its superpower position, it is still a Great Power in terms of the ingredients of such power. It is territorially large, strategically abutts on Central Asia, China and Iran — an area of political, security and economic interest to India.

Russia is endowed with enormous natural resources, technological capacities, trade potential and, over and above all, a highly talented reservoir of human resources. It still is the most important military power in the world after the US. Most importantly, Russia perhaps gives a higher priority to India in its foreign policy and strategic calculations than the US or other power centres of the world. It is logical, therefore, for India to cultivate and nurture relationship with Russia in the context of historical experience, current policy orientations, tangible mutuality of interests and mutual benefits.