Having invested in Pervez Musharraf for the success of the new peace process with Pakistan, India is not in a position to protest too much at the political cover the U.S. is offering him on the nuclear question.

AS IT begins to digest the implications of Pakistan's role in the global spread of nuclear weapons, the international community is responding at two levels. The first involves getting Pakistan to kick the habit of proliferation. The second — long-term and systemic — is about strengthening the global nuclear order and preventing a recurrence of the kind of nuclear black marketeering by those seeking to emulate the father of the Pakistani bomb, Abdul Qadeer Khan. Developments on both the fronts will be of considerable interest to India. Although the first aspect is important and gets all the attention in India, the second is of equal significance. It is at that level that India has many opportunities to shape the new international debate on reforming the current set of non-proliferation rules.

There have been enough hints in the American media that the recent nuclear charade in Pakistan — the nuclear confessions by Dr. Khan and the quick pardon by the Pakistan President, Pervez Musharraf — does not mark an end to this complex story. It is only the first act of a fascinating drama between Washington and Islamabad. There is a lot more to be said and done.

While more information on proliferation from Pakistan dribbles out, the United States is stepping up pressure on Gen. Musharraf to deliver much more on the ground than he has already done. The U.S. does not for a moment believe Gen. Musharraf's assertions that the Pakistan Army, which nurtured and controlled the national nuclear programme from the very outset in the early 1970s, has nothing to do with Dr. Khan's nuclear activity. Washington, however, is willing to save Gen. Musharraf's face so long as he cooperates in taking additional measures to bring Pakistan's nuclear programme under tighter control.

The U.S. needs Gen. Musharraf for a variety of purposes — including the pursuit of its objectives in Afghanistan. While offering an exit from the corner that Gen. Musharraf finds himself in, Washington would like to extract as much as possible from the Pakistani leader on the nuclear question. That is what the current bargaining between Washington and Islamabad is about. For one, the U.S. would want a full disclosure on the past proliferation activity of Dr. Khan and the Pakistani establishment. That will be crucial in understanding the extent of the damage done by the onward proliferation from Pakistan. For another, the U.S. would also like a credible set of actions from Gen. Musharraf that no future proliferation would take place from Pakistan. This is where a whole range of issues relating to the potentially controversial monitoring of the Pakistani nuclear programme comes in.

It will not be difficult to assess Gen. Musharraf's bottom line. He would want strong assurances that there will be no attempt by the U.S. to roll back Pakistan's nuclear weapons programme. Secondly, he would like to avoid any international monitoring of the Pakistani nuclear programme. That would be politically explosive at home and could be interpreted as the first step on the slippery slope towards the denuclearisation of Pakistan. Would Gen. Musharraf accept a quiet U.S. assistance and monitoring of his nuclear assets to prevent their leakage to other nations? The answer to that question depends on how strong the American pressure is and how much political traffic Islamabad could bear.

In any case, there is no way that India can influence the outcome of the current deal-making between the U.S. and Pakistan. The Bush administration and Gen. Musharraf need each other. Having invested in Gen. Musharraf for the success of the new peace process with Pakistan, India is not in a position to protest too much at the political cover Washington is offering him on the nuclear question. The outcome of the U.S.-Pakistan bargain would be determined by a variety of political factors. But whatever may be the results of this deal-making, it would have important implications for India. That precisely may be the reason India is quietly watching the negotiations between the two sides rather than jumping into this debate. At this moment, silence is clearly golden for Indian diplomacy.

India, however, has begun to respond at the second level, to the emerging international debate on strengthening and reforming the nuclear order. The new set of initiatives on nuclear proliferation now being contemplated will have a more enduring and wider impact on India's own security. India has a big stake in preventing these new rules from working against its own interests. More important, India has a historic opportunity to shape the emerging global debate by offering sensible proposals for international action and joining global initiatives that are in everyone's interest.

If it effectively intervenes in this debate, India could find ways to achieve a goal it had set for itself long ago — to differentiate its nuclear programme from that of Pakistan. India gingerly stepped into this discourse, when the External Affairs Minister, Yashwant Sinha, last week offered general remarks — at a joint press conference in the capital with the British Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw — in which he called for a wider international discussion on the implications of the nuclear developments in Pakistan.

The National Security Adviser, Brajesh Mishra, has gone a step further. Addressing an international security conference in Munich last Saturday, Mr. Mishra offered India's own diagnosis of the new threats and the kind of responses the world is contemplating. He underlined the fact that the old non-proliferation order is no longer effective. The international context has changed so much, thanks to the rise of non-state actors such as terrorist groups, suicide attacks, new incentives for proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and failing states. Referring to measures being contemplated to deal with the challenge, Mr. Mishra said: "A multilateral consultative machinery with international credibility can provide legitimacy to such measures. But for it to be effective, it has to be evolved with wide and representative consultations."

What are these non-proliferation measures that Mr. Mishra is referring to? First, the proliferation security initiative (PSI) that the U.S. has developed in recent months for a cooperative military interdiction of international air and sea traffic in sensitive materials and technologies. Joint military exercises have already been undertaken by the U.S. and 10 other "founding countries" to develop operational capabilities for such interdiction. Fifty other countries have reportedly extended their support to this initiative.

Secondly, a set of proposals from the Group of Seven Western countries in recent years to improve the safety and security of nuclear materials worldwide. Thirdly, the proposal now broadly endorsed by the International Atomic Energy Agency's Dr. el-Baradei to put new restrictions against countries acquiring capabilities in what is called a "full fuel cycle." The idea is to prevent the development of national capabilities to produce nuclear weapons materials among non-nuclear weapons states. Nations will be asked to forego such capabilities in return for assurances of international supply of nuclear fuel for legitimate needs. There are other measures for the further strengthening of export controls among advanced states to prevent proliferation and for enhancing inspection procedures by the IAEA. The U.S. President, George W. Bush, was expected to come with additional ideas for international action on Wednesday.

Many of these provisions are sweeping and some of them go beyond the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. These measures are part of an effort to build structures and mechanisms outside the NPT to strengthen the global nuclear order. Mr. Mishra's remarks at Munich suggest an Indian readiness to cooperate with the new non-proliferation initiatives provided New Delhi is fully consulted and its own interests are taken on board. That is the core of the new Indian nuclear position, which has many other elements.

First, India shares the objective of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons despite the fact that it has stayed outside the NPT. Secondly, India's record on non-proliferation has been a responsible one and its nuclear policies and programmes cannot be equated with those of irresponsible states. "Clubbing partners against proliferation with countries of true proliferation concern is a self-defeating approach, which can only weaken the cause of genuine non-proliferation," Mr. Mishra said. Thirdly, in identical statements issued by Mr. Bush and the Prime Minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, last month, it was underlined that India and the U.S. "are partners in controlling the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction." The challenge for New Delhi and Washington now is to find creative ways to make this proposition a reality. This demands intensive Indo-U.S. consultations and practical cooperation that go beyond the old NPT framework to find effective ways to counter the growing threat from the spread of nuclear weapons.