THE PARDON GRANTED to Abdul Qadeer Khan by Pakistan's President, Pervez Musharraf, sends out wrong signals. Others involved in the global network for clandestine nuclear proliferation would have learnt the lesson that they can attain immunity from punishment by exploiting the strategic vulnerabilities of governments. The question is whether General Musharraf could have done anything else. He probably exaggerated the threat of a nationalist backlash in order to ensure that the international community did not criticise his action too strongly. It was the fear that Dr. Khan would make embarrassing revelations about the military-dominated establishment's role in proliferation activities that induced the Pakistan President to stay his hand. It would have been very difficult for rogue technocrats to smuggle centrifuges and other components to Iran, Libya or North Korea without the knowledge or connivance of higher authorities. The Khan Research Laboratories and its personnel are constantly under the surveillance of the military and its intelligence services. That these pieces of sensitive equipment were usually transported on military aircraft and, in the case of North Korea, bartered for missiles offers further proof of the establishment's involvement. However, an exposé of the role played by retired senior commanders could cause convulsions within the military. General Musharraf cannot afford any discontent within the ranks at a time when he is challenged by fundamentalist forces. The international community has preferred to play along with the Pakistan President because it believes that he is really intent on leading his country and the military on a moderate course. Most governments would have been embarrassed to deal with Pakistan if the extent of the military's involvement in proliferation was revealed in excruciating detail.

General Musharraf has vowed that he will not yield to demands that Pakistan should permit external agencies to inspect its nuclear facilities. He is not willing to allow foreigners to question even those technocrats and military officials who were interrogated by domestic agencies. In any case, he is unlikely to be pressed to do so at any time soon since the United States administration has not merely expressed its satisfaction with General Musharraf's efforts to dismantle the Khan network, but has actually praised it. However, Islamabad will not be able to hold back the information in its possession forever. While the U.S. claims that it has used information provided by the International Atomic Energy Agency to break up the proliferation network, the dimensions of the threat are so large that every possible lead will have to be pursued. The imperatives of domestic politics in an election year are likely to drive the Bush administration to demand from Pakistan a comprehensive, even if classified, accounting of all proliferation activities. It will be difficult for General Musharraf to resist this demand even though the security of his country's strategic assets might be compromised once American nuclear experts get their hands on data that have so far remained secret.

Minister for External Affairs Yashwant Sinha has correctly pointed out that the proliferation activities of Dr. Khan and associates are a matter of concern for the entire international community and not for India alone. In wisely declining to avail itself of this opportunity to pillory Pakistan, New Delhi appears to have finally wound up its efforts to persuade the major powers to label its sub-continental rival a rogue state. That General Musharraf has taken due note of India's current attitude is yet another sign of Indo-Pakistan relations moving in the direction of maturity. Cooperation between governments, especially those that control active nuclear programmes, has become all the more necessary now that the danger posed by clandestine proliferation has been revealed in a new dimension.