A qualitative change in sight

IN identical statements on January 13, President Bush and Prime Minister Vajpayee jointly announced the concretisation of a new strategic equation between India and the United States. The statement by Mr Bush was issued at Monterrey in Mexico where he was participating in a meeting of South American Heads of State. Mr Vajpayee's statement came in New Delhi. The two Heads of Government announced that India and the US had agreed to expand cooperation in the areas of civilian nuclear activities, civilian space programmes and high technology trade. Both sides also agreed to commence negotiations on missile defence and related issues.

It is pertinent to reproduce the text of the rationale that Mr Bush gave for this important agreement. He said: "We are partners in the war on terrorism and we are partners in controlling the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and means to deliver them. The vision of the US-India strategic partnership which Prime Minister Vajpayee and I share is now becoming a reality. The expanded cooperation is an important milestone in transforming the relationship between the US and India, based increasingly on common values and common interests. The agreement will deepen the ties of commerce and friendship between our two nations, and will increase stability in Asia and beyond”.

The policy pronouncement on January 13, is the result of painstaking negotiations at official and diplomatic levels between the two countries spread over the last 18 months or so. Mr Brajesh Mishra's interaction with his US counterparts laid the foundation for these agreements. Former Foreign Secretary Kanwal Sibal held discussions with US Under Secretary for Commerce Kenneth Juster. Details of these agreements were negotiated at several meetings of the Indo-US High Technology Cooperation Group.

Indo-US relations have had their hiccups since 1998, when India conducted its nuclear tests and also expanded its military missile capacities. India's disappointment over the US involvement with the Musharraf government and India's reticence about responding to the US invitation to send Indian troops to Iraq did affect the evolving positive chemistry in Indo-US relations in the early 1990s. Differences of opinion on these points, however, did not influence the broad constructive orientations in Indo-US interaction as is evident from this latest high-level policy statement on strategic cooperation, issued simultaneously by Mr Bush and Mr Vajpayee. The factors which contributed to the process are the personal equation between the two leaders. Secondly, the general supportive posture adopted by India in favour of the US on a number of important policy decisions taken by President Bush regarding national missile defence and theatre missile defence, the stabilisation of Afghanistan and the US regional policies related to Asia contributed to this. Mr Bush acknowledging the existentialist reality of India becoming a nuclear weapons power and India's policy decision not to conduct further nuclear tests and to abide by the non-proliferation export control regimes neutralised the differences of opinion on India's nuclear weaponisation to a great extent.

The policies of reforms and liberalisation of India's economy also evoked a positive response from the US. There is a contentful convergence of interests between India and the US on countering international terrorism and religious extremism. Overarching these factors is the perception in the US establishment that in the post-Cold War era, India as a stable democracy, based on institutional solidity, can be a more reliable partner in the US policy objectives in the Asian region. This US perception has translated into expanded economic relations as well as greater cooperation between the defence establishments of the two countries.

India taking the initiative in restoring a dialogue with Pakistan strengthened this perception about India as a rational and stabilising factor in West Asian and South Asian regions which are in ferment due to the recent developments in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan.

These positive trends were backed up by the strategic community and think-tanks in both countries which interacted with each other on a continuous basis over the last five years or so. An example of the significance of these non-governmental contacts is the report on "New Priorities in South Asia, US Policy toward India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan,” prepared by an independent task force of former ambassadors under the auspices of the Council on Foreign Relations and the Asia Society of the US.

The agreement between Mr Vajpayee and Mr Bush will result in US assistance in safety for India's nuclear facilities. It will lead to cooperation between the two nuclear regulatory agencies, and the joint production of civilian satellites. It will also result in easing the unilateral licensing requirements for the transfer of high technology and dual-use technology items for India.

The negotiations on missile defence for India indicate an inclination on the part of the US to provide some kind of a missile defence umbrella to India in tandem with the Indian missile defence programme.

The political and strategic implications of the Vajpayee-Bush statements are worth noting. The US decision to engage India in the spheres of peaceful uses of nuclear energy and space, and to cooperate in missile defence indicates that the US and India have to put their disagreements and apprehensions about India's nuclear and missile weapons behind them. There is a sufficient climate of trust between the two countries to move forward for cooperation in these sensitive fields.

Mr Bush's statement that India is a partner and that this partnership will increase stability in Asia and beyond is an acknowledgement of India assuming a significant position in the US strategic and security plans in Asia. This assessment finds confirmation in the National Security Paper issued by the National Security Council of the US in September 2002, where there are specific references to India's potentialities as a partner of the US.

Having referred to these positive implications of the Bush-Vajpayee statement and the follow-up action which Foreign Minister Yashwant Sinha will take in Washington, it is necessary to assess the impact of the developing Indo-US equations. India would have to be sensitive and alert about reactions from Russia, China and Pakistan to this development. The equations with the US should not negatively affect India's relations with China and Russia. One has to examine whether the nuclear, space and missile cooperation will result in the US desiring a quid pro quo in capping or restricting India's freedom of options to sustain its nuclear and missile defence capacities. Will these agreements increase the US pressures on India to compromise with Pakistan on Kashmir beyond the threshold which India can reasonably cover India will have to tailor its export control regimes conforming to US standards which is not difficult. The question is how fast India can do this without eroding its political autonomy while dealing with the issue.

US policies regarding not exporting civilian nuclear plants to India or not cooperating with India on joint space launches are not going to change. Will there be indirect pressures on India to fashion its policies towards Iran in conformity with the US apprehensions and attitudes towards that country.

India will have to carefully calibrate its policies on these issues while moving ahead to translate the policy decisions of the January 13 joint statement into operational realities. There are also indications that this process would be gradual.

Mr Mark Grossman, US Under Secretary of State, stated in a Press briefing on the Bush-Vajpayee statement in Washington that while the joint statement indicated a significant stage in Indo-US relations, the implementation of the proposals would take time. One suspects that the same reaction would be there from the Indian establishment also, given the issues to be sorted out. India's approach should be to assiduously build relations with the US on the basis of this strategic agreement without losing the freedom to take decisions.

The writer is a former Foreign Secretary of India.