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Got a grip, so gently now

January 14, 2004

There is reason for satisfaction that India-Pakistan relations have moved in the right direction on the margins of the 12th Saarc summit in Islamabad.

In some respects, the outcome of discussions between Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Pervez Musharraf went beyond expectations, and not only because of the disturbing ambiguities which characterised New Delhi's public pronouncements on the possibilities of bilateral discussions with Pakistani leaders during the summit.

The Indian government began by stating there is no likelihood of any meeting between Vajpayee and Pakistani leaders. Then a month before the summit, Vajpayee announced in Lucknow that he may be willing to meet Prime Minister Zafarullah Khan Jamali. Then a deliberate negative nuance was introduced — that if such a meeting takes place it would be a courtesy call. A week before the summit, indications were given that Vajpayee may not have any objection to meeting Musharraf, but this also would be a courtesy call and nothing more.

Ultimately, Vajpayee had separate meetings of a substantive nature with Jamali and Musharraf. The results of the discussions went beyond what was expected in the context of policy statements made by New Delhi before the Saarc summit. Not only were some significant decisions taken to move forward in the process of normalisation, but a road map for further interaction was also clearly stated at the end of the visit.

It was agreed that the present ceasefire will be extended indefinitely. It was announced that the bilateral dialogue will be resumed by February and that the dialogue will cover a composite agenda, including issues related to J&K. Vajpayee and Musharraf agreed that high level political contacts will be sustained regardless of the ups and downs in India-Pakistan relations.

While India expressed its willingness to discuss issues related to J&K, Pakistan pledged that it would not allow any terrorist activity from territories under its control. There was also an agreement that within the framework of the additional protocol on countering terrorism, India and Pakistan will cooperate in combating the menace.

It is worthwhile examining the progress made so far in India-Pakistan peace efforts since April 2003 and to speculate on what constructive steps can be taken to make substantial progress for normalising relations. The suggestions and proposals made so far, some of which are in the process of being implemented, are essentially confidence building measures aimed at creating a positive atmosphere for restoring dialogue now scheduled for February.

India should move forward beyond these CBMs and address the substance of the issues affecting India-Pakistan relations. The official dialogue will be resumed from February and could contain the following elements. The Directors-General of Military Operations of both countries should meet once every three months to ensure a continuation of the ceasefire and to maintain peace and stability on the LoC. This arrangement should go beyond ‘hotline' telephone connections existing between the two DGMOs, and which hopefully now stand activated. The meetings between DGMOs should continue regardless of marginal violence that occur in J&K.

The official level bilateral dialogue should be at the foreign secretaries' level. During this dialogue, a signal should be given that India is willing to exchange views on Kashmir in a realistic and practical manner. India could renew the offer to hold discussions on a No War Pact or an agreement on peace and cooperation with Pakistan, drafts of which have been in existence since 1983. The suggestions for such agreements made during the tenure of Zia-ul-Haq and Indira Gandhi did not work because India wanted two elements in this agreement: first, that India and Pakistan should not allow any foreign military bases in their respective territories; and, second, that the agreement should cover the territories of J&K on both sides of the LoC.

The first condition was rooted in the Cold War situation which is no longer relevant. The second condition on Kashmir can be met given the agreement between Vajpayee and Musharraf to discuss Kashmir and to cooperate in countering terrorist activities. India could suggest that India and Pakistan should resume discussions on three draft agreements which already exist in draft form from the period 1988-1996.

These agreements deal with issues of redeployment of forces of both sides away from Siachen and agreement on completing the Wullar or Tulbul project and an agreement on the boundary at Sir Creek between Gujarat and Sindh. The agreements could be updated and finalised taking into account the developments that have occurred since 1986. India could suggest that the proposals made in the Lahore memorandum for nuclear risk reduction in February 1999 should be implemented. An experts group of Indian and Pakistani representatives should discuss methods of nuclear risk reduction between the two countries.

The general agreement reached on finalising the extradition treaty should be pushed forward. Pakistan seems to be serious about this suggestion, given the fact that Minister of Interior, Faisal Saleh Hayat, has sent an invitation to Deputy Prime Minister L.K. Advani to work out and finalise the modalities of this extradition treaty. This would be an important step forward in countering terrorist activities and other illegal and criminal activities across the India-Pakistan border.

The two nations should move forward to liberalise and expand bilateral economic and commercial relations in the context of the agreement reached at the Saarc summit meeting to move forward on the proposals for the creation of South Asia Free Trade Area (Safta) by 2006. That this proposal has the support of the business community of both the countries is clear from the fact that CII and FICCI have been interacting with their Pakistani counterparts.

These organisations have prepared position papers and policy advocacies for economic cooperation which should be taken note of, given governmental support, and implemented. If these steps are taken by mutual consent, the environment for a serious dialogue on the Kashmir issue will be improved.

There was much hype in the media over Pakistan not having referred to the question of J&K in its policy pronouncement at the summit. This is nothing new and remarkable. The Saarc charter specifically stipulates that no country will raise bilateral issues at dispute at summit deliberations.

The heads of State/governments of Pakistan have abided by this stipulation in the formal Saarc proceedings. In fact, the Indian delegation had been assured in this respect by the Pakistani delegation at the Saarc summit in Kathmandu, Colombo and Islamabad in the Eighties and the early Nineties.

What is important is that bilateral exchanges between Vajpayee and Pakistani leaders, the discussions on Kashmir and the issue of terrorism did not turn polemical. There was an effort on the part of both Pakistan and India to discuss these issues in a constructive manner.

This outcome was not a result of any sudden surge of positivism. There are reports that the preparations for these discussions began in April or May with back-channel diplomacy between New Delhi and Islamabad. Unlike the period preceding the Agra summit, the officials of both sides painstakingly prepared the ground for these discussions which culminated in Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister Brajesh Mishra's interaction with senior Pakistani counterparts during January 1-4. These discussions included interaction between Musharraf's advisor Tariq Aziz and the director general of the ISI.

What then are the prospects of this normalisation process progressing on satisfactory lines? They hinge on two issues. First, a tangible reduction in cross-border infiltration and terrorism in J&K with the onset of summer in April. Second, the attitude of both countries on dealing with the issue of J&K, particularly that of Pakistan.

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